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Subsequent to an automobile
accident causing the death of the mother of five minor children, their guardian
ad litem brought action for damages for wrongful death. The guardian did not,
however, prosecute the claim to a trial on the merits, but stipulated for a
settlement with defendants against whom no cause of action existed. Judgment
was entered upon such stipulation and was satisfied. Thereafter the guardian
instituted the present action against the parties actually responsible for the
accident, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota, construing the settlement
to be only a release, held that granting summary judgment on the ground
that prior judgment was res judicata was error. Feather v. Krause, 91 N.W.2d 1,
(N.D. 1958).
The general question as to whether the payment by a stranger of a mistaken liability on his part will operate to bar collection against the one
actually liable, whether in tort or in contract, is a troublesome and contentious
one. One line of authority holds such compensation to be so far effected in
equity and good conscience that the law will not permit another recovery
for the same damage. In sharp contrast are those cases holding that a release
to, or settlement by, one not in fact liable does not bar action against the party
legally liable.2 Still other jurisdictions whose wrongful death statutes are
construed to be punitive rather than compensatory, hold that, as to concurrent
tortfeasors, the release of, or payment by one will not extinguish the claim.3
Where contract actions are involved the weight of authority holds that where
payment in full is made by a stranger such payment extinguishes the claim,
at least where the intent of the parties is clear that the claim shall be satisfied. 4 In view of the theory justifying the recovery of damages,5 it would seem
that this should also be the preferable view when tort actions are involved
and there are many cases so holding. 6
In the instant case, the court construed the settlement agreement to be
simply a release and not a satisfaction, although not distinguishing between
the two. The terms are not the same, however-satisfaction denoting an acceptance of full compensation for an injury, and release denoting a surrender of
the cause of action. 7 Thus, if in fact, a settlement is a full satisfaction of a
OF PAYMENT ACCEPTED FROM THID PARTIES.
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claim, then many cases would hold the claim to be extinguished.8 But if, in
fact, the settlement is only a release then the following results obtain:
(1) if the cause of action is against concurrent wrongdoers, acting in concert,
most courts would enforce the common law rule that a release to one is a
complete surrender of any cause of action against the other; 9 (2) if the
release is given to one not legally liable such release, per se, will not operate
as a discharge to others who are responsible. 10 In the writer's opinion another
result could also be reached: if the release is given to one not legally liable,
such one in return, making a payment in full satisfaction of the releasee's
claim, it would appear that no concern should be had with the legal efficacy
of the release itself, but rather consider the release as merged in the satisfaction.
Thus, essentially, the transaction would be only one of full satisfaction.
In view of the above observations, the following questions become pertinent when considering the facts and decision of the instant case: (1) did
plaintiff intend the settlement to be a full satisfaction for the injuries sustained
in the accident? (2) did plaintiff intend only that the settlement should
operate as a release as to the parties making payment thereunder? (3) was
the settlement intended to be a release plus a hll satisfaction? The intent
mentioned above should, it would seem, be determined in the light of the
language of the settlement agreement, the amount paid, and the attending
circmnstances.
It is submitted that the above inquiries present questions of fact for jury
determination."1 Noteworthy also, the settlement could be taken as a prima
facie acknowledgment of satisfaction and the burden placed upon plaintiff
to prove that it was not. 1 2 In the instant case, however, the court on its own
accord construed the settlement to be a release. In so doing, besides passing
upon what were perhaps jury questions, the court obviated the defense that
might be made upon subsequent trial as to the operation of the settlement as a
full satisfaction of plaintiff's cause of action-i.e., it had already been judicially
determined that a release only was involved.
It would seem that the determining factor in any such case as that presented
should be whether or not, in fact, plaintiff has been fully compensated. He
should never be compelled to surrender his cause of action against any
wrongdoer unless he has intentionally done so, or unless he has received full
compensation therefor.
JAMES M.
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EFFECT OF REFUSAL FOR RE-

QUEST FOR COUNSEL ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EvIDENCE.-Defendant, a 31-year-old
college graduate with law school training, was arrested for murder and interrogated by police. His request for counsel was refused despite a statute making
such refusal a misdemeanor. Shortly thereafter he signed a confession. The
United State Supreme Court held, four justices dissenting, that a conviction
8.' See note 6 supra.
9. Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 (1932); Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont.
112, 112 P.2d 1055 (1941); Aliian v. Ben Schlossberg Inc., 8 N. J. Super. 461, 73 A.2d
290 (1950).
10. Randall v. Gerrick, 93 Wash. 522, 161 Pac. 357 (1916).
11. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
12. See Dwy. v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915) (Irrebuttable presuniption).

